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THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATE CODE'S OMITTED
SPOUSE STATUTE AND
IN RE ESTATE OF TIMMERMAN
I. OLD WILLS AND NEW SPOUSES: AN INTRODUCTION
South Carolina's omitted spouse statute' attempts to accomplish two
ends--carrying out the decedent's probable intent and protecting the still-
surviving spouse.2 In some instances these two ends obviously merge so that
accomplishing one also accomplishes the other. But often courts cannot
reconcile these two ends and therefore must furnish an equitable solution. The
omitted spouse statute provides a useful tool in our probate system, affording
courts flexibility in achieving these two goals ingrained in the Probate Code.
In In re Estate of Timmerman,3 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
confronted the situation described above. The case involved a contest over the
estate of George Bell Timmerman, Jr., a former South Carolina governor. The
parties were Timmerman's widow (and second wife), who claimed an intestate
share as an "omitted spouse," and a relative of Timmerman's first wife, who
claimed a share as a named beneficiary under the will Timmerman executed
during his first marriage.' In this case, carrying out the decedent's probable
intent and protecting the surviving spouse would not achieve the same result.
The court considered the extrinsic facts existing prior to Timmerman's death
and how these factored into the omitted spouse statute's provisions in
determining the proper disposition of his estate.5 The court ultimately
determined that Timmerman's surviving spouse was entitled only to the
protection of the elective share statute.6
The parties litigated the disposition of Timmerman's estate for more
than three years and before three different courts.7 By exercising one of many
options available to him prior to his death, Timmerman could have spared the
parties all of the time, money, and emotion the litigation consumed.
This Comment first examines the situation underlying Timmerman to
aid in understanding the extrinsic facts. It then reviews how the omitted spouse
statute came into existence, its purpose, and how courts have applied it, with
emphasis on the statute's application in Timmerman and whether the court
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1998).
2. See In re Estate of Murray, 193 Cal. Rptr. 355, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Mary
Ellen Kazimer, Comment, The Problem of the "Un-omitted" Spouse Under Section 2-301 ofthe
Uniform Probate Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 481, 485-86 (1985).
3. 331 S.C. 455, 502 S.E.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1998).
4. Id. at 457, 502 S.E.2d at 920-21.
5. See id. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 921-22.
6. Id. at 461,502 S.E.2d at 922.
7. See id. at 458-59, 502 S.E.2d at 921. The probate court, circuit court, and court of
appeals all considered Ingrid's omitted spouse claim.
1
Wagner: Probate Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
reached an equitable solution. Finally, this Comment analyzes how the statute
affects surviving spouses, will beneficiaries, and estate planners and how
Timmerman failed to take the appropriate steps before his death to avoid
potential conflict.
II. THE HONORABLE GEORGE BELL AND INGRID: THE DECEDENT AND
HIS SPousE
The man atthe center of the Timmerman case served the State of South
Carolina in different capacities ranging from circuit judge to governor.8 The
legal experience and background of George Bell Timmerman, Jr., whom
people called "George Bell,"'9 are important factors to consider when examining
his estate and the litigation that surrounded it. His failure to plan his estate
properly after his many years of experience on the bench also sheds light on
how the omitted spouse statute might affect a citizen with no legal education.
Timmerman spent most of his life married to Helen Dupre
Timmerman. The two remained married for forty-five years until her death in
1980.10 During this marriage, he executed a will leaving his entire estate to
Helen or, if she predeceased him, to her sister, and to his "nieces and nephews
as alternate beneficiaries."'" As a result of this provision, the alternate
beneficiaries became the primary beneficiaries of Timmerman's will after
Helen's death.
After spending thirteen years as a single man, Timmerman married his
second wife, Ingrid, who was over thirty years younger than Timmerman. 2
Although the two were married for only twenty-two months, 3 Timmerman
gave Ingrid close to $1.2 million in assets' 4 and also visited two estate-planning
lawyers to discuss his estate during their short marriage. Both advised
Timmerman and drafted documents for him, but he never executed any of
them.' 5 In September 1994, he suffered injuries in the auto accident that
eventually resulted in his death at the age of 82 in November of that year.'
6
Following his death, the alternate beneficiaries offered the will Timmerman
executed during his marriage to Helen for probate, and Ingrid filed a petition
claiming her share under the omitted spouse statute.
17
8. Obituary, George Timmerman, Opposed Integration as S.C. Governor, THENEWS
& OBSERvER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1994, at B4.
9. Editorial, Product ofHis Times, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 6,1994, at A8.
10. See Timmerman, 331 S.C. at 457, 502 S.E.2d at 921.
ll. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 458, 502 S.E.2d at 921.
14. See id. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 921-22 (including a joint account, retirement
benefits, and life insurance proceeds).
15. See id. at 458, 502 S.E.2d at 921.
16. Id.; Charles Wickenberg & Lee Bandy, Former S. C. Governor Timmerman Dies
at 82, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
17. Timmerman, 331 S.C. at 457,502 S.E.2d at 920-21.
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III. THE OMITTED SPOUSE STATUTE
A. Evolution of the Statute
The will is an ancient concept that has evolved over time,
incorporating many refinements." The omitted spouse statute is one of those
refinements; it continues today as part of the Probate Code. 9 To understand the
statute filly, one has to look to the common law, where marriage affected the
wills of men and women differently. For men, marriage alone did not revoke
a will executed before marriage, and if a man had a child, this alone did not
revoke his will. But a combination of these two events did revoke a man's
will.2" For women, the common law revoked a premarital will upon marriage
alone." The rationale behind this result was that the common law acted for a
married woman who, because she lacked the capacity to make a will, also
lacked the capacity to revoke a premarital will.' Most states have discontinued
this unequal treatment of men and women, and courts in at least one state have
ruled that this type of treatment is unconstitutional.'
Whether to revoke a person's will at marriage involves reconciling two
principles ingrained in the testamentary process-attempting to carry out the
testator's intent and protecting the surviving spouse. Today, most states protect
surviving spouses through the use oftwo devices-elective share statutes' and
omitted spouse statutes?' Some states use both devices, while others use only
one.26 In the twenty-five states that use the elective share device, 7 the courts
18. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOKOF THE LAW OF WILLS § 2, at 7-10 (2d ed.
1953) (tracing the development of the will in ancient Egyptian, Assyrian, Jewish, Greek, and
Roman civilizations).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
20. 2WELLiAMJ. BowE&DOUGLASH. PARKER, PAGEONTHELAWOFWILLS § 21.89,
at 501 (1960); WILLIAM M. McGovWRN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTs AND ESTATES § 3.7, at 113
(1988).
21. 2 Bows & PARKER, supra note 20, § 21.95, at 513; MCGOvERN, supra note 20,
§ 3.7, at 113.
22. 2 BowE & PARKER, supra note 20, § 21.95.
23. Parker v. Hall, 362 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. 1978); see McGOvERN, supra note 20,
§ 3.7, at 113.
24. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
25. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1998).
26. Of the 31 states using such statutes to protect surviving spouses, 13 states,
including South Carolina, use both types. See infra notes 27 & 31 (listing those states having
elective share statutes and those states having omitted spouse statutes, respectively).
27. ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.202 (Michie 1998); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-201 (1998);DEL. CODEANN.tit. 12, § 901 (1995); FLA. STAT.ANN. § 732.201
(West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-202 (Michie Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-201
(1979); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-6a202 (West Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 2-201 (West 1998); MND. CODE ANN., EST. & TRusTs § 3-203 (Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-201 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-221 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
2313 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (West 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1996); OR.
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applying it do not balance the two principles. The elective share statutes
automatically balance these principles, mainly by emphasizing the surviving
spouse's protection by allowing that spouse to take a portion of the testator's
estate even if the testator executed the will after the marriage. On the other
hand, the omitted spouse statutes allow courts to balance the testator's probable
intent with the concern for protecting the surviving spouse.28 In reviewing this
type of statute and its use, these two principles apparently are the primary
concerns of the courts. In In re Estate of Timmerman,29 the court of appeals
reconciled these two concerns and provided another example of the statute's
equitable application.
B. Section 62-2-301 of the South Carolina Probate Code
South Carolina's omitted spouse statute, which Ingrid Timmerman
relied upon in the litigation surrounding her husband's will, provides:
(a) If a testator fails to provide by
will for his surviving spouse who married
the testator after the execution of the will,
the omitted spouse, upon compliance with
the provisions of subsection (c), shall
receive the same share of the estate he
would have received if the decedent left no
will unless:
(1) it appears from the will
that the omission was intentional;
or
(2) the testator provided
for the spouse by transfer outside
the will and the intent that the
transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by statements
of the testator or from the amount
of the transfer or other evidence.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-201; S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 29A-2-202 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 31-4-101 (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODEANN. § 75-2-202 (Supp. 1998); VA. CODEANN. § 64.1-13
(Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.02 (West Supp. 1998);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-5-101 (Michie 1997).
28. SeeBruceL. Stout, PlanningforPossiblePretermitted Children and Pretermitted
Spouses, 24 EST. PLAN. 269, 272 (1997) ("The purpose of a pretermitted spouse statute is to
protect the surviving spouse of a marriage that was not contemplatedwhen the testator's will was
executed."). But see Kazimer, supra note 2, at 497 ("[The omitted spouse statute] should not be
construed to protect the surviving spouse when that goal conflicts with the testator's intent.").
29. 331 S.C. 455, 502 S.E.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1998).
[Vol. 50: 979
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(b) In satisfying a share provided
by this section, the devises made by the will
abate as provided in § 62-3-902, [the
intestate transfer statute].
(c) The spouse may claim a share
as provided by this section by filing in the
court and mailing or delivering to the
personal representative, if any, a claim for
such share within eight months after the
date of death or within six months after the
probate of the decedent's will, whichever
limitation last expires.30
At least nineteen other states have omitted spouse statutes similar to South
Carolina's.3 1 The treatment other states give to their statutes provides a better
understanding of the South Carolina version and of the Timmerman case.
Reviewing the use of the statute in other jurisdictions also shows the many
different situations in which the statute can arise. Understanding the situations
that could potentially cause one to be an omitted spouse is critical in preventing
it from ever arising. Preventing a surviving spouse from ever being an omitted
spouse is a simple affair, and competent estate planning can prevent the
statute's application.
C. Applying the Statute
A surviving spouse must satisfy four conditions to qualify as an
omitted spouse under the statute. First, the court must find that the testator
married the surviving spouse after executing the will in question.32 Second, the
will must not provide for the surviving spouse.33 Third, it must not appear
"from the will that the omission was intentional."3 4 Finally, the court must find
that the testator did not provide for the surviving spouse with transfers outside
the will, which the testator intended to "be in lieu of a testamentary
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301.
31. ALA. CODE § 43-8-90 (1991); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2301 (West 1995); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 21610 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-301 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.301 (West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-301 (1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-301
(West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.126 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-301
(West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.235 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-331
(1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2320 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-15 (West 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN.§45-2-301 (Michie Supp. 1995);N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-01 (1996);20PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2507(3) (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-301 (Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-69.1 (Miechie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.095 (West 1998).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301(a).
33. Id.
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provision.,
35
One can classify each of the four conditions as either qualifying
conditions or exclusions. The first two are qualifying conditions, and the
surviving spouse must establish them as the first step to qualifying as an
omitted spouse. However, even if the surviving spouse meets the qualifying
conditions, the court may still deny the surviving spouse classification as an
omitted spouse if it finds either of the two exclusions applies. These two
exclusions disqualify a surviving spouse, who has satisfied the qualifying
conditions, from the statute's protection.
This Comment examines how the court in Timmerman and how other
courts have approached these conditions and exclusions. Because the first
qualifying condition, that of marrying the surviving spouse after the execution
of the will, is self-explanatory, this Comment focuses primarily on the "not
provided for by the will" condition. Following the examination of the
qualifying conditions, this Comment addresses each exclusion and reviews
situations where a testator executed a will before marrying a future surviving
spouse and failed to mention that person in the will. As discussed above,
automatic qualification as an omitted spouse does not necessarily ensue. The
courts use the two exclusions to determine the proper disposition of the
testator's estate.
1. "Not Provided for by the Will"
After establishing that the surviving spouse married the testator after
the execution of the will in question, the court must find that the surviving
spouse was not provided for by the will. In many situations, such as in
Timmerman, the will simply does not mention the surviving spouse.37 In these
situations, courts typically find that this omission satisfies the condition of not
being provided for by the will.3"
A more complex case than that described above arises when a will
35. Id. § 62-2-301(a)(2).
36. See infra Part III.C.4 (elaborating on who has the burden under the statute of
proving or disproving the four conditions).
37. Timmerman executed a will during his first marriage, many years before he
married Ingrid. This will was still valid at his death and obviously did not provide for Ingrid. See
In re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 457, 502 S.E.2d 920, 921 (Ct. App. 1998); see also
Becraft v. Becraft, 628 So. 2d 404, 405-06 (Ala. 1993) (focusing on exclusions where the
surviving spouse proved that the testator executed a will during his first marriage that did not
mention her); In re Estate of Aspenson, 470 N.W.2d 692, 693-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(applying exclusions where the testator executed his will seven months before he met his future
surviving spouse).
38. See, e.g., In re Estate of Taggart, 619 P.2d 562, 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
(examining exclusions upon evidence that the will was made before the marriage and did not
mention the surviving spouse).
Vol. SO: 979
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executed before the marriage actually mentions the testator's future spouse.39
These cases require courts to determine if the testator failed to provide for the
surviving spouse even though the surviving spouse is mentioned in the will. In
making this decision, many courts focus on whether the testator contemplated
marriage when executing the will.' These courts theorize that if the testator
contemplated marriage with the surviving spouse, then that person is not an
omitted spouse and fails the second qualifying condition. If, on the other hand,
the testator did not contemplate marriage, then the surviving spouse meets the
qualifying conditions, and the court must determine whether one of the
exclusions applies. The South Carolina Supreme Court has expressly adopted
the contemplation-of-marriage view;41 in Miles v. Miles the court held that
"absent specific language in the [w]ill, or sufficient extrinsic evidence that a
bequest was made 'in contemplation of marriage,' a spouse has not been
'provided for' under the 'omitted spouse's statute."' 42
While many courts discuss the question of marriage contemplation as
the primary issue in determining whether the surviving spouse was provided
for by the will, other courts reject this question as a factor.43 For example, in In
reEstate ofKeeven, 44 the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that, considering the
Uniform Probate Code's careful drafting, its failure to mention the
contemplation-of-marriage requirement "must have been deliberate." s As seen
in Keevan and other cases where courts reject this question as a consideration,
many other factors evidence whether the testator provided for the surviving
spouse.4" This approach might be considered the "overall factors" test. Of the
39. See, e.g., Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 1982);
In re Estate of Keeven, 716 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Idaho 1986); Miles v. Miles, 312 S.C. 408, 409,
440 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1994); In re Estate of Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1982); Porter
v. Porter, 726 P.2d 459,462 (Wash. 1986).
40. Compare Ganier, 418 So. 2d at 260 (finding that the will was not made in
contemplation of marriage and that the husband was an omitted spouse entitled to an intestate
share of his wife's estate where the wife's prior-to-marriage will gave the future husband two
bank accounts), andMiles, 312 S.C. at 409-11,440 S.E.2d at 883-84 (finding that the wife had
not been provided for by the will where her husband's prior-to-marriage will left her a car and
a life estate in his home and where the husband did not make the bequest in contemplation of
marriage), with Keeven, 716 P.2d at 1226, 1229-30 (finding that the wife provided for her
husband with a prior-to-marriage will that gave him one-sixth of her real property even though
this devise was not made in contemplation of marriage), and Christensen, 655 P.2d at 649
(rejecting the view that a bequest must be made in contemplation of marriage and finding that
the wife was provided for by a prior-to-marriage will that left her four percent of her husband's
estate and had a value of $436,000).
41. Miles v. Miles, 312 S.C. 408, 440 S.E.2d 882 (1994).
42. Id. at 410-11,440 S.E.2d at 883 (citation omitted).
43. See, e.g., Christensen, 655 P.2d at 649.
44. 716 P.2d 1224 (Idaho 1986).
45. Id. at 1230.
46. One court listed eight factors to consider in determining whether a will provides
for a surviving spouse mentioned in the will:
(1) the alternative takers under the will, (2) the dollar
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factors courts applying this test consider, the two on which the courts primarily
focus are the amount of transfers to the surviving spouse and whether these
transfers sufficiently provided for that spouse.47 If these factors are sufficient,
then the surviving spouse typically is not found to have passed the second
qualifying condition, and the court does not have to consider the exclusions.
Wills that mention the surviving spouse give courts their first
opportunity to consider equitable concerns in deciding whether the surviving
spouse is entitled to the protection of an omitted spouse statute. Because the
will in Timmerman did not mention Ingrid, the court did not have this initial
opportunity. At any rate, the question of the testator's intent lurks behind the
contemplation of marriage view and the overall factors view. As discussed
below, courts view this intent as a crucial part of their analysis when
determining whether an exclusion applies to the surviving spouse.
2. "Intentional Omission"
The first exclusion in South Carolina's omitted spouse statute provides
that a spouse will not qualify as an omitted spouse under the statute if "it
appears from the will that the omission was intentional."48 Comparing the
statute's language with the factors the court considered in reaching its decision
in Timmerman is difficult to reconcile. In its opinion, rather than focusing on
the will offered for probate, the court of appeals focused on Timmerman's
failure to execute a new will even though he consulted estate planners.49 Under
the statute's language, the court should determine intentional omission by
looking only at the will the testator prepared before his marriage." This part of
the statute does not instruct courts to consider other evidence when determining
whether this exclusion applies as it does for determining whether the provided-
for-outside-the-will exclusion applies.5 The court seemingly inferred that,
because Timmerman chose to keep the old will over the new wills prepared for
(3) the fraction of the estate represented by that gift,
(4) whether comparable gifts were made to other
persons, (5) the length of time between execution of
the testamentary instrument and the marriage, (6) the
duration of the marriage, (7) any inter vivos gifts the
testator has made to the surviving spouse, and (8) the
separate property and needs of the surviving spouse.
Christensen, 655 P.2d at 650.
47. See, e.g., id. at 648-49 (finding that $436,000 left to a surviving spouse
sufficiently provided for her).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1998).
49. In re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 459, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App.
1998).
50. The statute states that the exception applies "if it appearsfrom the will that the
omission was intentional." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301(a)(1) (emphasis added).
51. See id. § 62-2-301(a)(2). This subsection explicitly allows for examination of
other evidence when making the "provided for" determination.
[Vol. 50: 979
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him and because the old will did not mention his second wife, he intended to
omit her.1
2
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have
followed similar logic in ignoring the statutory language. For example, inn re
Estate of Dennis3 the Missouri Court of Appeals found that a husband
intentionally omitted his spouse by executing a will on the same day they were
married. 4 The court focused on extrinsic facts rather than on the will in
question,55 as did the court in Timmerman. These cases suggest that looking
beyond the language of a will is acceptable when applying the statute and
determining if the intentional-omission exclusion applies despite the lack of
any sign that legislatures intend courts to do so. This view allows courts to
examine not only the will, but also any extrinsic facts that could aid them in
interpreting the testator's intent. This use of evidence enables courts to balance
the scale in favor of what they view as the testator's intent.
3. "Provided for Outside the Will"
The second exclusion in South Carolina's omitted spouse statute
allows courts to decide if the testator "intended" to provide for the surviving
spouse with nonprobate transfers instead of including the spouse in a new will.
This exception is the third part of the statute that enables courts to fashion
equitable results. An analysis of this exclusion shows the extent of the courts'
maneuvering room. To satisfy this exclusion, the testator must provide for the
spouse outside the will and intend this provision to be in lieu of any
testamentary disposition.5 6 In determining the testator's intent, the court can
examine statements made by the testator, it can consider the amount of the
transfer, or it can use "other evidence.""s Essentially, the testator's intent
determines whether the spouse was "provided for outside the will." The
testator could have intended any amount, no matter how small, to be in lieu of
52. Timmerman, 331 S.C. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 922.
53. 714 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
54. Id. at 666.
55. Id. at 665-66; see also Perkins v. Brown, 27 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1946). In Perkins,
the court stated:
[T]he provision contained in the statute, to the effect
that the surviving spouse shall share in the estate of
the decedent "unless the will discloses an intention
not to make such provision" does not mean that such
intention must be written into the will in express
words; but that such result may follow as an
unavoidable inference to be drawn from the
conditions and circumstances of the parties at the
time of the execution of the instrument.
Id. at 523.
56. S.C. CODEANN. § 62-2-301(a)(2).
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a testamentary provision. The final two words in this subsection of the statute
("other evidence") enable courts to consider virtually any bit of extrinsic
evidence in determining the testator's intent for this exclusion.
In Timmerman the court of appeals found that "Timmerman intended
to provide for [Ingrid] by transfers outside of the will." s8 This ruling on the
statute's second exclusion prevented Ingrid from gaining the protection of
South Carolina's omitted spouse statute.s9 In making this determination, the
court considered much circumstantial evidence in determining whether
Timmerman intended to provide for Ingrid outside the will. The court pointed
out that "Timmerman gave Ingrid and her children substantial financial gifts"
before the two were married.6 The court also considered joint bank accounts
Ingrid received, the amount of money Ingrid would receive monthly from
Tiimerman's retirement benefits, money he gave her from timber sales, and
proceeds Ingrid would receive from Timmerman's life insurance policy.6'
These transfers amounted to almost $1.2 million.62 The court based its
determination that Timmerman intended to provide for Ingrid outside the will
on "the sheer magnitude" of the transfers to Ingrid.63
The court also supported its determination that Timmerman provided
for Ingrid outside the will with a discussion of Timmerman's visits to estate
planners." The court used the magnitude of the transfers and Timmerman's
failure to execute a new will to conclude that he had provided for Ingrid and
that, if he had wanted her to take more, he would have executed a new will.
While the court of appeals apparently used the evidence of Timmerman's visits
to estate planners to reach its conclusion, this evidence could point to a very
different conclusion. If Timmerman intended the transfers to be in lieu of a
testamentary provision, why was he visiting estate planners? A logical answer
is that he did not intend those transfers to be all Ingrid received. Also, from his
experience with the law, Timmerman certainly knew that Ingrid would receive
at least an elective share, so his visits to the estate planners could evince his
desire that Ingrid receive more than the elective share.
Most courts focus primarily on the same evidence as the Timmerman
court-the amount of the nontestamentary transfers. The Alabama Supreme
Court concluded that the size of transfers to a surviving spouse is relevant to
whether the transfers were in lieu of a testamentary provision, regardless of
whether the amount is comparable to the intestate share the spouse could expect
58. In re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 459, 502 S.E.2d 920, 921 (Ct. App.
1998).
59. Id. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 922.
60. Id. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 921.
61. Id. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 921-22.
62. Id. at 459, 502 S.E.2d at 922.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 458, 502 S.E.2d at 921.
[Vol. SO: 979
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to receive.6- In In re Estate of Taggart" the New Mexico Court of Appeals
found that the decedent intended to provide for the surviving spouse with three
transfers outside the will amounting to one-fifth of the decedent's estate.67 The
decedent's statements to friends provided additional evidence that he intended
these transfers to provide sufficiently for his spouse.5 Contrary to the ruling in
Taggart, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in In re Estate ofBeaman,69 ruled that
the decedent did not intend for items the surviving spouse removed from the
couple's home and money she withdrew from a joint checking account before
his death to be transfers in lieu of a testamentary provision, ° but the small
amount of the transfers seemed to be the court's determining factor. In addition
to these cases, many courts have found that surviving spouses were not omitted
spouses when they received proceeds from life insurance policies, remainders
in real estate, and balances of joint accounts. 7' These cases demonstrate that
most courts focus mainly on the amount of the transfer, but will also view any
other available evidence.
4. Burden of Proof
While most courts harmoniously apply and interpret omitted spouse
statutes with little difference between jurisdictions, the courts treat the burden
of proof differently. The burden of proof raises questions in two portions of the
statute. First, when a will mentions the surviving spouse, who has the burden
of proving whether the testator has failed to provide by will for his surviving
spouse? Second, after resolving this first question, who has the burden of
proving whether the intentional-omission and provided-for-outside-the-will
exclusions eliminate the spouse?72 One can rephrase these questions as asking
which party has the burden of proving the qualifying conditions and which
party has the burden of proving the exclusions. Courts have developed three
answers to these questions. First, some courts place the entire burden on the
surviving spouse to prove she is an omitted spouse.73 In these jurisdictions the
surviving spouse must prove the qualifying conditions and that neither of the
65. Becraft v. Becraft, 628 So. 2d 404,407 (Ala. 1993).
66. 619 P.2d 562 (N.M. CL App. 1980).
67. Id. at 569.
68. Id.
69. 583 P.2d 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
70. Id. at 274-75.
71. See, e.g., Wester v. Baker, 675 So. 2d. 447, 447-48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(survivorship in a joint tenancy); In re Estate of Aspenson, 470 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (pension plans, joint accounts, stock, and life insurance); In re Estate of Knudsen,
342 N.W.2d 387,391 (N.D. 1984) (life insurance benefits and remainders injoint tenancies). But
see Noble v. McNerney, 419 N.W.2d 424, 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that pension
benefits of the decedent were not a sufficient transfer to provide for the surviving spouse).
72. See supra Parts HI.C.2, IIl.C.3 (discussing these exclusions).
73. See, e.g., In re Estate of Keevan, 716 P.2d 1224, 1230 (Idaho 1986); In re Estate
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exclusions applies. Second, some courts require the proponent of the will to
prove disqualification.74 A surviving spouse has to show only that the marriage
occurred after the execution of the will; the will proponents must then prove
that the spouse fails the qualifying condition of "not provided for by the will"
or that one of the exclusions applies. Third, some courts have adopted a shifting
burden of proof.75 The shifting burden of proof requires the surviving spouse
to prove that the testator did not provide for him by will, and if the surviving
spouse meets this burden, the proponent of the will must then prove that one
of the exclusions applies-either the testator intentionally omitted the surviving
spouse or intended to provide for the surviving spouse outside the will.
The court in Timmerman did not explicitly discuss the burden of proof
for the statute. In Timmerman, the will did not mention the surviving spouse;
therefore, only the secondpart of the burden-of-proof problem arose. By laying
out the evidence of the transfers to Ingrid and of Timmerman's visits to estate
planners, the court seemingly placed the burden on the proponents of the will
to prove that one of the exclusions applied.76 However, to understand fully
where South Carolina places the burden of proof, one must analyze
Timmerman along with an earlier South Carolina omitted spouse case, Miles
v. Miles.
77
In Miles the South Carolina Supreme Court faced a situation where a
prior-to-marriage will mentioned the surviving spouse.73 In this decision, the
court apparently placed the burden of proof on the surviving spouse at the first
stage. The court in Miles ruled that the will did not provide for the spouse
because "there [was] no evidence the bequest was made in contemplation of
marriage."79 The court seemingly reached this determination based on the
surviving spouse's testimony that she, at the time the decedent executed the
will, "had rejected numerous marriage proposals from" him." Although the
Miles court considered the burden-of-proof issue for the first part of the statute,
the court did not address the burden of proof for the exclusions.
By combining the decisions in Timmerman and Miles, one gains a
complete view of how courts in South Carolina might address the burden of
proof. These decisions, when viewed together, indicate that South Carolina
uses the shifting burden of proof. This option is popular in commentary on the
subject."' In Hellums v. Reinhardt,82 the primary decision that discusses and
74. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shannon, 274 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
75. See, e.g., Hellums v. Reinhardt, 567 So. 2d 274, 277 (Ala. 1990).
76. See In re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 458-59, 502 S.E.2d 920, 921-22
(Ct. App. 1998).
77. 312 S.C. 408,440 S.E.2d 882 (1994).
78: Id. at 409, 440 S.E.2d at 883.
79. Id. at411, 440 S.E.2d at 883.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Katrina T. Sather, Comment, The Omitted Spouse Statute as It Applies
in Community Property States, 31 IDAiOL.REV. 1149, 1166 (1995) ("A shifting burden ofproof
is more realistic and equitable."). But see Kazimer, supra note 2, at 507 ("[T]he burden ofproof
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implements the shiftingburden of proof, the Alabama Supreme Courtdiscussed
the burden of proof at length and stated that the shifting burden of proof is
"most consistent with the terms of the statute. ... ."" Notably, the Alabama
omitted spouse statute is nearly identical to South Carolina's."
IV. EFFECTS OF THE OMITTED SPOUSE STATUTE
A. Effects on Surviving Spouses andPotential WillBeneficiaries
Omitted spouse statutes attempt to protect surviving spouses and to
fulfill testators' desires,85 but these statutes' effects are widespread. Depending
on the situation a testator may leave behind at death, the surviving spouse and
beneficiaries may face a confrontation that will affect them in many
ways-primarily emotionally and financially.
Litigation involving these statutes causes emotional strain that comes
from many directions. First, having to fight in court with someone that is likely
a relative immeasurably impacts a person. Second, the amount in controversy
can be large, and the potential loss causes great stress, especially considering
that each party obviously feels entitled to receive its share, either based on the
applicable omitted spouse statute or the will executed by the testator. Finally,
the litigation creates emotional uncertainty--even after the court's decision, a
party, whether it won or lost, will never know the testator's true intentions.
Surviving spouses will always wonder whether the decedent intended to
exclude them, and potential beneficiaries will always wonder whether the
decedent would have revoked the will if the decedent had remembered to do
so or had known the law.
In addition to these emotional concerns, the statute also affects the
parties financially. The parties feel this effect primarily in two ways. First, it
may take months or years to resolve the issues, and the parties' financial
situations will remain uncertain until the court reaches its final determination.
Second, as is obvious from Timmerman, litigation is costly. While this cost
obviously affects both parties, it potentially impacts the party named in the will
as a beneficiary most significantly. Unlike the surviving spouse, who may
recover some amount under an elective share statute, the named beneficiary
may end up with nothing. While seeking to achieve the goals of the statute
(protecting the spouse and carrying out the testator's intent), courts could
should be allocated to the surviving spouse .....
82. 567 So. 2d 274 (Ala. 1990).
83. Id. at 277. A second Alabama Supreme Court ruling three years later confirmed
the shifting burden of proof as the standard in that state. Becraft v. Becraft 628 So. 2d 404, 406
(Ala. 1993); see also Wester v. Baker, 675 So. 2d 447, 448 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (applying the
shifting burden of proof).
84. Compare ALA. CODE§43-8-90 (1991)with S.C. CODEANN. § 62-2-301 (Law. Co-
op. 1987 & Supp. 1998).
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potentially leave the named beneficiary in the worst position of all the parties.
Using the Timmerman case as an example, if the proponents of the will had lost
their battle in the court of appeals and chose not to appeal, they would have
gone home empty-handed after spending almost four years in court, whereas
Ingrid still received her statutory elective share even though she lost under
South Carolina's omitted spouse statute.86 Unlike the beneficiaries, a surviving
spouse, like Ingrid, could use the amount she received under the elective share
to pay her cost of litigation.
B. Effects of the Statute on Attorneys
In addition to the effects of ornitted spouse statutes on the parties to the
action, they also cause problems that estate planners must consider when
advising testators and when drafting wills. Malpractice is always a frightening
concern. To avoid it, an estate planner must consider the statute when planning
any client's estate. First, for married clients, their spouses may die first, and the
clients may remarry as in Timmerman's case. The lawyer should draft the will
to provide for this contingency. Second, in the case of unmarried persons, the
concerns are obvious-the possibility of a future marriage and whether the
testator wishes the will to remain valid after the marriage.
A provision stating the testator's desires if there is a marriage or
remarriage remedies the concerns in both of these situations.87 In South
Carolina, such aprovision should effectively prevent application of the omitted
spouse statute, but no court in the state has ruled on this particular issue. A
court might instead find the spouse's omission unintentional if the surviving
spouse is not specifically named in the will. 8 To counter the possibility of such
a decision, a planner should advise the client on the consequences of marriage
or remarriage and the need to execute a new will or re-execute the old will after
the marriage.
In Heyer v. Flaig,"9 an attorney malpractice action, an attorney
prepared a will for a single woman devising everything to her daughters." The
woman told the attorney that she was about to marry,9' but the attorney did not
advise her of this decision's consequences on her will. The woman later died,
86. In re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 461, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App.
1998).
87. Bruce L. Stout recommended the following provision: "This will recognizes that
I am unmarried and that I may marry at some future date. Regardless of whether I am married
or not at the time of my death, I want this will to control the disposition of my estate." Stout,
supra note 28, at 273. However, he also noted that "some states require specificity in regard to
the potential spouse." Id.
88. Id.
89. 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969).
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and the surviving husband successfully claimed a share as an omitted spouse.'
The daughters then sued the attorney for malpractice,93 as third party
beneficiaries, for failing "to advise" their mother and for failing "to include in
the will any provision as to the intended marriage."'94 The court ruled that "[a]
reasonably prudent attorney should appreciate the consequences of a post-
testamentary marriage, advise the testator of such consequences, and use good
judgment to avoid them if the testator so desires."'95
C. Timmerman 's Options Before His Death
Any one of a number of options available to Timmerman would have
prevented the situation he left when he died. He may have contemplated one
or more of them during his visits to estate planners, but he never properly
established any of them. First, Timmerman could have executed a new will
properly documenting his intentions. Second, he could have simply re-executed
the old will or executed a codicil which would have effectively republished the
will at that date.9 Either of these options would have rendered South Carolina's
omitted spouse statute inapplicable because Timmerman would no longer have
married "after the execution of the will."97 In addition, Timmerman could have
expressly stated that he intended one of his transfers to Ingrid "be in lieu of a
testamentary provision."" However, unlike the first two suggestions, which
would automatically prevent the use of the statute, this option would still allow
the surviving spouse to assert the statute because the decedent executed the will
before marriage without mentioning the surviving spouse, thereby establishing
the qualifying conditions. However, if Timmerman made his intention to
provide outside the will clear enough, then the court could have prevented the
surviving spouse from being an omitted spouse under the exclusion in section
62-2-301(a)(2). The only advantage of this option is its easy application
92. Id. at 162-63.
93. The elements of a legal malpractice action in South Carolina are well established.
See Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 322 S.C. 433,435 n.2, 472 S.E.2d 612,
613 n.2 (1996) (stating that the elements of malpractice are "1) the existence of an attorney-
client relationship; 2) breach of a duty by the attorney; 3) damage to the client; and 4) proximate
causation of the client's damages by the breach"). In a situation of blatant bad advice, such as
in Heyer, an intended beneficiary in South Carolina should have no problem establishing these
elements.
94. Heyer, 449 P.2d at 163.
95. Id. at 165; see also Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) (holding that
"intended beneficiaries of a will who lose their testamentary rights because of failure of the
attorney who drew the will to properly fulfill his obligations under his contract with the testator
may recover as third-party beneficiaries").
96. See In re Estate of Ivancovich, 728 P.2d 661,662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that where testator had executed a will before his marriage to the surviving spouse and then
during that marriage executed a codicil republishing the will, the will spoke from the new date
and the surviving spouse was not entitled to protection under the omitted spouse statute).
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-301(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1998).
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without visiting an attorney.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the elective share statute, what is the purpose of the omitted
spouse statute, and is it really needed? Consideration of the statute's two goals,
carrying out the testator's intent and protecting the surviving spouse, helps
answer these questions. If a spouse's only remedy for exclusion from a will is
the elective share, as is the case in many states, then the spouse is automatically
protected and courts do not need to attempt to carry out the testator's intent.
However, the protection the elective share guarantees the spouse may not be
as significant as the testator prefers. The omitted spouse statute combines with
the elective share statute to resolve this dilemma. Where both statues are
available, courts can weigh the evidence to fashion unique equitable solutions
in every case. In a case such as Timmerman, the court can determine that the
elective share is the only remedy available to the surviving spouse and also
carries out the intention of the testator.
The omitted spouse statute serves a valuable purpose in determining
the proper disposition of a decedent's estate and works well with the elective
share statute to ensure that the surviving spouse is protected and that the
testator's intent is carried out. While the statute can fulfill its purpose, estate
planners can and are obligated to help prevent the statute's application. If
planners fulfill this obligation, and testators listen to them, courts should never
have to deal with this statute.
While proper advice from an estate planner helps individuals to avoid
the application of the omitted spouse statute, the statute more realistically
fulfills its role when applied to individuals who do not have estate planners. In
these situations, the statute is most valuable. Many individuals may assume that
when they marry, their new spouses are entitled to their entire estates if they
predecease those spouses. The result of leaving only the state's statutory
elective share, if available, would probably surprise many of these individuals.
In such situations, the omitted spouse statute does incredible justice. For this
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